From encrypted chats to decentralized messaging
Encrypted messengers are experiencing a second wave.
Apps like WhatsApp, iMessage and Signal made end-to-end encryption (E2EE) the default expectation. However, most still depend upon phone numbers, centralized servers, and plenty of metadata, equivalent to: B. who you discuss with, when, from what IP and on what device.
This is what Vitalik Buterin is aiming for along with his latest X contribution and donation. He argues that the subsequent steps for secure messaging are permissionless account creation without phone numbers or Know Your Customer (KYC) and far stronger metadata protection. In this regard, he highlighted Session and SimpleX, sending 128 Ether (ETH) each to further advance this direction.
Session is a very good case study because it attempts to mix E2E encryption with decentralization. There isn’t any central messaging server, traffic is routed through onion paths, and user IDs are keys as an alternative of phone numbers.
Did you recognize? 43 percent of individuals using public Wi-Fi report a knowledge breach, with man-in-the-middle attacks and packet sniffing against unencrypted traffic amongst probably the most common causes.
This is how Session stores your messages
The session relies on public key identities. When you log in, the app generates a key pair locally and derives a session ID from it, without requiring a phone number or email.
Messages are transmitted through a network of service nodes using onion routing, in order that no single node can see each the sender and receiver. (You can see your message's node path in Settings.) For asynchronous delivery if you're offline, messages are stored in small groups of nodes called “swarms.” Each session ID is assigned to a particular swarm and your messages are stored there encrypted until your client retrieves them.
Historically, messages within the swarm had a typical lifespan of about two weeks. After that, the network copy is gone and only what’s in your devices stays.
And yes, Session maintains a neighborhood database of your chats and attachments, so you may return months or years. For this reason, the app download could be around 60 to 80 MB, however the installed size grows as you send media, cache thumbnails, and manage chat history. Public documentation and independent reviews have described this split between short-lived network storage and long-lived local storage.
You can reduce this by deleting chats, using disappearing messages, or deleting media. If you may still see it, it’s somewhere in your device.
Quick mode notifications
When it involves notifications, the trade-off between privacy and user experience (UX) becomes clear.
On iOS, Session offers two modes:
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Slow mode is a background query. The app wakes up commonly and checks its own network for brand new messages. It is more private but could be laggy or unreliable, especially in case your operating system is aggressive with background activity.
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Quick mode uses push notifications. Session leverages Apple Push Notification Service on iOS and an identical approach on Android to deliver timely notifications.
The controversial part is the fast mode. According to Session's own support documents, usage means:
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Your device's IP address and push token are made available to a push server operated by Apple.
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Your session account ID and push token are shared with a push server running the session in order that it knows what notifications to send where.
Decisive:
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The servers don’t see message content because it stays E2EE.
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Session says Apple and Google also don't see who you're talking to or the precise time of the message, beyond what their generic push infrastructure necessarily logs.
If that bothers you, there's Slow Mode, but you'll pay with missed or late notifications. This alternative is an element of what decentralized messengers have to take into consideration now.
Jurisdiction, Transparency and Government Inquiries
Session's governance has also modified.
The app was initially managed by the Australian non-profit Oxen Privacy Tech Foundation (OPTF). At the tip of 2024, a brand new Swiss organization, the Session Technology Foundation (STF), took over the management of the project. The OPTF's final transparency report covers the fourth quarter of 2024; Subsequent requests might be processed and published by STF.
Session's support documentation for requests for information states:
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Because Session is decentralized and E2EE, the muse doesn’t have special access to user messages or keys.
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The STF publishes retrospective transparency reports summarizing law enforcement requests and their processing.
This transparency page is nearly actually the reference point that users consider after they speak about a site that shows when governments are asking for information. They are the general public records the muse keeps to document when authorities contact, what they request and the way Session responds.
What can they realistically hand over?
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Potentially: Logs from web sites, file servers or the infrastructure they directly operate, equivalent to push relays or STUN and TURN servers for calls, subject to Swiss law and all applicable international requests.
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Not: Decrypted messages or master keys for user chats, provided the implementation matches the protocol description.
In the Swiss foundation regime, transparency is comparatively low in comparison with other legal systems, which is why voluntary reporting and technical data restrictions are particularly vital.
In other words, decentralization doesn't stop governments from asking, nevertheless it does limit what could be handed over.
Did you recognize? When police infiltrated the EncroChat encrypted phone network, they intercepted greater than 115 million criminal messages from an estimated 60,000 users, leading to over 6,500 arrests and nearly €900 million in seized assets worldwide.
Quantum resistance, calls and “beta perpetually”?
The concern is: harvest now, decode later. Attackers can record encrypted traffic today and wait for future quantum computers to interrupt current public key systems.
Session's response is a serious redesign of the protocol. In a recent blog post, the team introduced Session Protocol v2, which goals so as to add:
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Perfect forward secrecy with ephemeral keys
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Post-quantum key exchange using ML-KEM (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber), the NIST-standardized KEM also present in Signal's PQXDH and Apple's PQ3.
So is Session quantum resistant today?
Not within the strict sense. While version 2 is in development, it continues to be based on classic elliptic curve cryptography. The roadmap points to hybrid post-quantum systems, but until these are implemented, tested and rolled out to all clients, you must assume standard end-to-end encryption security and supply an upgrade plan.
Calls are one other recurring problem. According to the session:
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Voice and video calling can be found, nevertheless it's still a beta feature that requires you to enroll.
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They currently use peer-to-peer WebRTC, which exposes your IP address to the opposite party and a session-driven STUN or TURN server for signaling and media routing.
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Onion routing calls via Lokinet are intended to cover IPs more thoroughly, but will not be yet the default setting.
Session's own blog and FAQ specifically warn that folks in extremely sensitive situations should avoid activating calls for now.
So the long beta phase partly reflects how difficult it’s to mix low latency calling, onion routing and serious anonymity guarantees.
What decentralization actually changes for you
The session demonstrates each the guarantees and limitations of decentralized secure messaging.
On the positive side:
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You can create an account with out a phone number or email address (or another ID), which is according to Buterin's idea of permissionless account creation.
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Your messages travel over a multi-node onion routing network, reducing the quantity of metadata that a single operator must see or log.
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Moving administration to Switzerland and using open source clients and transparency reports can increase public scrutiny of changes to the code base or infrastructure.
But decentralization shouldn’t be a canopy for invisibility:
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Local storage in your phone still poses an enormous risk in case your device is confiscated or compromised.
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Quick mode notifications and WebRTC calls pass IP-level metadata to infrastructure providers, even in the event that they never see your plain text messages.
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Post-Quantum protection stays on the roadmap until Protocol v2 is delivered and mature.
When considering a session, it is sensible to make use of slow mode because the default if metadata protection is more vital than fast notifications. Use disappearing messages and commonly clean up old chats and media so there's less left in your devices. The same caution applies to calls. If associating a session ID with an IP address is an issue in your situation, it might be safer to depart voice and video disabled until the decision stack matures.
In a broader sense, E2EE alone isn’t any longer enough. As governments increase pressure on messengers and quantum threats move from theory to roadmaps, decentralization, metadata minimization and post-quantum upgrades will turn out to be central parts of what secure messaging means. Session is one among several projects attempting to deal with these challenges, each with its own trade-offs, strengths and limitations.
